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FROM AUTOMATION TO AUTONOMY: 
LEGAL AND ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY
GAPS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
INNOVATION
David Nersessian, JD, PhD* and Ruben Mancha, PhD**
Abstract
The increasing prominence of artificial intelligence (AI) systems 
in daily life and the evolving capacity of these systems to process data 
and act without human input raise important legal and ethical 
concerns. This article identifies three primary AI actors in the value 
chain (innovators, providers, and users) and three primary types of AI 
(automation, augmentation, and autonomy). It then considers 
responsibility in AI innovation from two perspectives: (i) strict liability 
claims arising out of the development, commercialization, and use of 
products with built-in AI capabilities (designated herein as “AI 
artifacts”); and (ii) an original research study on the ethical practices 
of developers and managers creating AI systems and AI artifacts.
The ethical perspective is important because, at the moment, the 
law is poised to fall behind technological reality—if it hasn’t already. 
Consideration of the liability issues in tandem with ethical 
perspectives yields a more nuanced assessment of the likely 
consequences and adverse impacts of AI innovation. Companies 
should consider both legal and ethical strategies thinking about their 
own liability and ways to limit it, as well as policymakers considering 
AI regulation ex ante.
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I. Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a powerful technological driver of innova-
tion and change. As noted by the founder and chairperson of the World 
Economic Forum:
Already, artificial intelligence is all around us, from self-driving 
cars and drones to virtual assistants and software that translate or 
invest. Impressive progress has been made in AI in recent years, 
driven by exponential increases in computing power and by the 
availability of vast amounts of data, from software used to discover 
new drugs to algorithms used to predict our cultural interests. Digi-
tal fabrication technologies, meanwhile, are interacting with the bi-
ological world on a daily basis. Engineers, designers, and architects 
are combining computational design, additive manufacturing, mate-
rials engineering, and synthetic biology to pioneer a symbiosis be-
tween microorganisms, our bodies, the products we consume, and 
even the buildings we inhabit.
1
AI systems decide what information we see on social media,
2
brake our 
vehicles when obstacles suddenly appear in our path,
3
and move money 
around with little human intervention.
4
Apple’s Siri makes us laugh,
5
and 
1. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What It Means, How to Re-
spond, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-
fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond.
2. See, e.g., Jared Schroeder, Marketplace Theory in the Age of AI Communicators, 17 
FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 22, 34 (2018) (noting that, for example, “Facebook’s news feed 
algorithm decides which items, out of countless possibilities, appear atop users’ apps and
browsers when they use the social media outlet.”).
3. See, e.g., Adam Thierer & Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent 
Vehicles and Driverless Cars, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 339, 344 (2015) (discussing 
U.S. Department of Transportation’s five-part scheme on vehicle automation, noting that 
“Level 1” automation, already in use today in autonomous vehicles, “include[d] electronic 
stability control or pre-charged brakes, where the vehicle automatically assists with braking to 
enable the driver to regain control of the vehicle or stop faster than by acting alone.”) (internal 
citations omitted).
4. See, e.g., Elizabeth Boison & Leo Tsao, Money Moves: Following the Money Be-
yond the Banking System, 67 DEP’T OF JUST. J. FED. L. & PRAC. 95, 111 (2019) (noting that 
“Facebook has partnered with both MoneyGram and Western Union to integrate ‘chatbots’
into its messenger service, facilitating the initiation of international and domestic transfers by 
Facebook users directly from Facebook’s interface.”). AI also powers high speed trading on 
Wall Street, with mixed results. See, e.g., Thomas Belcastro, Getting on Board with Robots: 
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Google helps us to remember our lives.
6
AI also plays a growing role in the 





and other kinds of robotic systems.
9
Trends suggest 
that the breadth and depth of AI utilization and integration into all aspects 
of daily life will multiply rapidly as technology develops and costs continue 
to drop.
10
AI already plays a critical role in the commercial sector. It is the driving 
force behind the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which “is characterized by a 
fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines between the physical, digital, 
and biological spheres.”
11
The economic impact of AI in this sector is esti-
mated to be between $3.5–$5.8 trillion annually across multiple industries 
and business functions.
12
New efficiencies and innovation grounded in 
How the Business Judgment Rule Should Apply to Artificial Intelligence Devices Serving as 
Members of a Corporate Board, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 263, 272 (2019) (noting positive re-
turns from AI trading systems as well as the role of AI in “flash crashes” of the market).
5. See e.g., Nick Bilton, Siri, Tell Me a Joke. No, a Funny One., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/fashion/siri-tell-me-a-joke-no-a-funny-one.html.
6. See e.g., Joelle Renstrom, The Sinister Realities of Google’s Tear-Jerking Super 
Bowl Commercial, SLATE (Feb. 3, 2020, 6:08 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/02
/google-assistant-super-bowl-commercial-loretta.html (criticizing Google’s “Loretta” Feb. 2, 
2020 Super Bowl commercial).
7. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has defined IoT as an “interconnected envi-
ronment where all manner of objects have a digital presence and the ability to communicate 
with other objects and people.” Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Dis-
cussion Draft of H.R.__, Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015: Hearing on H.R. 
1770 Before the Subcomm. on Com., Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com.,
114th Cong. 6 (2015) (statement of Jessica Rich, Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion, Federal Trade Commission). Other countries take a similar approach. See, e.g., OFF. OF 
PRIV. COMM’R OF CANADA, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PRIVACY 
ISSUES WITH A FOCUS ON THE RETAIL AND HOME ENVIRONMENTS 1 (2016), 
https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/1808/iot_201602_e.pdf (defining IoT as “the networking of 
physical objects connecting through the Internet.”).
8. See, e.g., Bruno Zeller, Leon Trakman & Robert Walters, The Internet of Things –
The Internet of Things or of Human Objects? Mechanizing the New Social Order, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 15, 34 (2020).
9. See, e.g., Ugo Pagallo, What Robots Want: Autonomous Machines, Codes and New 
Frontiers of Legal Responsibility, in HUMAN LAW AND COMPUTER LAW: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES, 25 IUS GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND JUSTICE 47,
47–65 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Jeanne Gaakeer eds., 2013) (considering the intersection of 
robotics technology with legal principles and systems).
10. See, e.g., RAYMOND PERRAULT ET AL., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE INDEX: 2019
ANNUAL REPORT (2019), https://hai.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ai_index_2019_report.pdf 
(tracking the pace of AI developments in areas such as technical progress, financial invest-
ment, research citations and higher education impacts).
11. Schwab, supra note 1. For comparative purposes, “[t]he First Industrial Revolution 
used water and steam power to mechanize production. The Second used electric power to cre-
ate mass production. The Third used electronics and information technology to automate pro-
duction.” Id.
12. See JACQUES BUGHIN ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, NOTES FROM THE 
AI FRONTIER: MODELING THE IMPACT OF AI ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 6 (2018), 
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widespread AI adoption are predicted to grow the global economy by $15.7 
trillion (14%) by 2030.
13
Billions of dollars in market value of top compa-
nies such as Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, and Apple are linked to their use 
of AI in products and services.
14
Despite its widespread economic benefits, the new AI “arms race”
15
presents unique challenges for the legal system. The law always has strug-
gled to keep pace with technological innovation and often finds itself be-
hind the curve.
16
With AI innovation in particular, the legal system must 
“embrace change and innovation as an imperative in a journey towards an 
ever-shifting horizon.”
17
There have been many proposals from a wide 








on-the-world-economy-September-2018.pdf?shouldIndex=false. These include the core busi-
ness practices of: (i) customer acquisition, retention and service, as well as pricing and promo-
tions (~$1.2–2.3 trillion); (ii) operations and supply chain management (~$1.2–1.9 trillion); 
and (iii) business optimization, risk management, and automation tasks (~$1.3 trillion). Id.
13. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, SIZING THE PRIZE: WHAT’S THE REAL VALUE OF AI
FOR YOUR BUSINESS AND HOW CAN YOU CAPITALISE? 3–4 (2017), https://www.pwc.com
/gx/en/issues/analytics/assets/pwc-ai-analysis-sizing-the-prize-report.pdf.
14. See Google Leads in the Race to Dominate Artificial Intelligence, ECONOMIST
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.economist.com/business/2017/12/07/google-leads-in-the-race-to-
dominate-artificial-intelligence.
15. See generally Peter Asaro, What Is an “Artificial Intelligence Arms Race” Any-
way?, 15 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 45 (2019) (discussing the “global artificial intel-
ligence (AI) arms race”).
16. E.g., Edward A. Parson, Social Control of Technological Risks: The Dilemma of 
Knowledge and Control in Practice, and Ways to Surmount It, 64 UCLA L. REV. 464, 471 
(2016) (noting that “[r]egulation . . . often lags behind innovation”).
17. Daryl Lim, AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change, 52
AKRON L. REV. 813, 874 (2019).
18. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb. 11, 2019). See also Re-
quest for Comments on a Draft Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, “Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications,” 85 Fed. Reg. 
1825 (Jan. 13, 2020) (requesting comments on draft policy statement relating to legal, regula-
tory and non-regulatory oversight of the development and use of AI applications outside of 
the Federal government).
For a recent analysis of current governmental use of AI, see DAVID FREEMAN 
ENGSTROM ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 6 (2020), https://law.stanford.edu/education/only-at-sls/law-
policy-lab/practicums-2018-2019/administering-by-algorithm-artificial-intelligence-in-the-
regulatory-state/acus-report-for-administering-by-algorithm-artificial-intelligence-in-the-
regulatory-state/#slsnav-report (studying “AI use at the 142 most significant federal depart-
ments, agencies, and sub-agencies” and providing “cross-cutting analyses of the institutional, 
legal, and policy challenges raised by agency use of AI”).
19. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 5356, 115th Cong. (2018) (proposing independent commission 
to consider artificial intelligence, machine learning, and related technologies from a national 
security standpoint); H.R. Res. 4625, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing a coordinated national 
strategy for developing AI). For additional details on Congressional engagement with AI top-
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and civil society groups
24
—on how to address the 
unique legal implications presented by the creation and use of artificial in-
telligence. A wide body of scholarship is emerging around such varied digi-
tal innovation topics as virtual and augmented reality,
25 sui generis regulato-
ry systems for AI implementation,
26
granting formal legal personality to AI 
systems,
27
and the role of AI in legal practice and the administration of jus-
tice.
28
Rather than add an incremental voice to an already-crowded chorus, 
this article takes an entirely different approach in order to arrive at a fresh 
perspective. It combines doctrinal analysis with an original research study, 
focusing on two complementary dimensions of AI innovation that have not 
ics, see CONGRESSIONAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CAUCUS, 
https://artificialintelligencecaucus-olson.house.gov/members (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
20. See, e.g., ACCESS NOW, MAPPING REGULATORY PROPOSALS FOR ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE IN EUROPE (2018), https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2018/11
/mapping_regulatory_proposals_for_AI_in_EU.pdf.
21. States have taken different approaches to AI-powered autonomous vehicles, for 
example. See, e.g., Ben Husch & Anne Teigen, Regulating Autonomous Vehicles, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research
/transportation/regulating-autonomous-vehicles.aspx (noting that 28 states had introduced leg-
islation to regulate autonomous vehicles).
22. The use of AI in medical devices, for example, has drawn scrutiny from federal 
regulators. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learn-
ing in Software as a Medical Device (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/medical-
devices/software-medical-device-samd/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-software-
medical-device (implications of AI in medical devices).
23. Tom Simonite, How Tech Companies Are Shaping the Rules Governing AI, WIRED
(May 16, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-tech-companies-shaping-rules-
governing-ai (discussing lobbying by industry group representing Microsoft, Facebook, and 
Apple around AI regulation). See also Yochai Benkler, Don’t Let Industry Write the Rules for 
AI, 569 NATURE 161, 161 (2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-01413-1 (not-
ing that “[i]ndustry has mobilized to shape the science, morality and laws of artificial intelli-
gence” and arguing that governments, consumers, and other stakeholders should take an ac-
tive role in ensuring that industry concerns did not dominate the debate).
24. For consideration of the positive and negative human rights implications of AI, 
compare Salil Shetty, Artificial Intelligence for Good, AMNESTY INT’L (June 9, 2017), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/artificial-intelligence-for-good, with Steven 
Melendez, AI Could Bring “Nightmare Scenarios,” Warns Amnesty International, FAST CO.
(June 13, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40584711/ai-could-bring-nightmare-
scenarios-warns-amnesty-international.
25. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Aug-
mented Reality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (2018).
26. See, e.g., Edmund Mokhtarian, The Bot Legal Code: Developing a Legally Compli-
ant Artificial Intelligence, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 145, 192 (2018).
27. See, e.g., Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the 
Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 94 (2015).
28. See, e.g., Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially Intel-
ligent Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 242, 246 (2019); Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence 
and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1305, 1326–35 (2019).
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yet been considered vis-à-vis each other: the legal liability arising out of AI 
innovation and deployment and the ethical development of AI in the first 
place. It frames questions of products liability from a new perspective in 
two ways. First, it focuses on three key actors involved in bringing products 
with built-in AI capabilities (herein designated “AI artifacts”) to market: in-
novators, providers, and users. Second, it considers the relative sophistica-
tion of the technologies in question, noting important differences in AI au-
tomation, augmentation, and autonomy.
The reframing of liability is only one part of the picture. In business en-
vironments, principles of ethical responsibility work in conjunction with li-
ability avoidance as powerful forces in shaping both corporate and individ-
ual behavior.
29
This article discusses findings from a new study on the 
ethical perspectives of AI developers and managers in the creation and de-
ployment of AI technologies. Consideration of both perspectives yields a 
more nuanced assessment of the likely consequences and impacts of AI in-
novation, both for companies thinking about how to limit their own poten-
tial liability and for policymakers considering AI regulation ex ante.
Proposals for the regulation of AI tend to be highly context-dependent, 
varying considerably depending on what objectives the regulatory scheme is 
intended to achieve. Regulating AI for the purpose of personal safety,
30
for 
example, is very different from schemes aimed at protecting AI-generated 
creative works through copyright,
31
which in turn differ markedly from 
broad regimes regulating AI as an aspect of wider social policies.
32
This ar-
ticle focuses on questions of civil liability in tort for physical injury or 
29. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J.1957, 1966 (2006) 
(“[C]onceptualizing ethics as a matter of avoiding liability can influence these dispositions, 
attitudes, and motives, and, therefore, how someone exercises her discretion . . . . Risk man-
agement conceives of ethical and legal provisions as a minefield of potential sources of liabil-
ity.”).
30. See Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Chal-
lenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 359–60 (2016) (discussing 
the challenges of defining AI in the context of a proposed regulatory regime to govern its 
use); see also id. at 388–98 (discussing tort liability and proposing a safety certification sys-
tem for AI).
31. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copy-
right, and Accountability in the 3A Era—The Human-Like Authors Are Already Here—A New 
Model, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 659, 673 (2017) (“There are as many definitions as there are 
types of AI systems. John McCarthy, who coined the term ‘Artificial Intelligence,’ did not 
provide an independent definition, while scholars Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig suggested 
almost ten different definitions. Definitions generally vary according to the targeted subject, 
emphasizing different aspects of AI systems”); see also Kalin Hristov, Artificial Intelligence 
and the Copyright Dilemma, 57 IDEA 431, 431 (arguing that programmers should receive 
authorship rights for AI creations).
32. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with Recommenda-
tions to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, EUR. PARL. DOC. P8-
TA(2017)0051 (2017) ¶¶ 49–65 (noting prospective need for liability regimes to cover next 
generation AI and robotic systems).
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property damage caused by AI artifacts. Questions of criminal liability are 
not addressed here, though it certainly is possible for malicious innovators 
to use AI artifacts to violate criminal laws (e.g., using robots to rob a bank, 
drones to assault an enemy, advanced “peeping tom” technologies to violate 
privacy, etc.).
33
Another working assumption here is that the AI artifacts in question are 
not intentionally designed to cause injury to human beings. In such cases, 
AI-enabled devices that harm someone actually are not defective—they are 
operating as intended. Thus, our analysis excludes AI artifacts such as so-
called “killer robots” designed for military purposes, even when those prod-
ucts make errors that end up killing the wrong army’s soldiers or civilian 
noncombatants.
34
Our discussion also excludes less direct forms of AI-
enabled “injury,” such as the use of COMPAS, an evidence-based risk man-
agement system that predicts recidivism from a defendant’s interview and 
criminal file, the results of which are used by judges in deciding appropriate 
sentences of incarceration.
35
The article is organized in five parts. Part I sets the scene by describing 
the role of AI in society today, as well as the role that it increasingly will 
play in the future as technology advances at a rapid pace. Part II offers a 
more nuanced approach to thinking about AI systems by positing three pri-
mary classifications of AI artifacts according to their functioning:
(i) Automation AI: Characterized by known pathways and defined 
characteristics, replacing known and repetitive human activities 
(e.g. sales chatbots, or repetitive tasks in manufacturing).
(ii) Augmentation AI: Designs based on known interactions with 
human operators—helping workers to recall and analyze data 
but leaving judgment and strategizing to necessary human 
counterparts (e.g. surgical robots, or the augmented reality 
game Pokémon Go).
(iii) Autonomy AI: Machine learning based on unknown interactions 
and environments, where the machine itself makes important, 
high stakes decisions—only primitive forms currently exist 
(e.g., today’s “self-driving” vehicles), but autonomy will be the 
33. See, e.g., Rachel Charney, Can Androids Plead Automatism? – A Review of When 
Robots Kill: Artificial Intelligence under the Criminal Law by Gabriel Hallevy, 73 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 69 (2015); see also Gabriel Hallevy, The Basic Models of Criminal 
Liability of AI Systems and Outer Circles (June 11, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402527.
34. See, e.g., Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban 
Killer Robots, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21
/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots.
35. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016) (holding that a circuit 
court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing does not violate a defend-
ant’s rights to due process).
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inevitable result of AI increasingly gaining the ability to deal 
with unstructured data and complex settings.
Part III considers strict products liability law as applied to AI artifacts. 
When a product causes injury, normally all distribution chain participants 
can be held liable—including creators, designers, manufacturers, suppliers 
of component parts or designs, distributors, retailers, owners, and operators. 
For greater clarity, this writing simplifies the liability construct to focus 
more precisely on the three primary types of actors in the distribution chain 
for AI artifacts:
(i) Innovators: Creators of either custom-designed or open-source 
AI algorithms and systems incorporated into AI artifacts. Inno-
vators may be nonprofit actors (e.g., research universities) or 
individuals as well as corporate entities. The AI itself may be 
brand new or a refinement of existing AI (e.g., modifying code 
from an open-source AI library).
(ii) Providers: Manufacturers who assemble various AI technolo-
gies and other components into products that may either be tac-
tile (e.g., self-driving car) or virtual (e.g., high-frequency trad-
ing program), and the distributors and retailers who help to 
bring those products to the end-user market.
(iii) Users: Owners who purchase AI-enabled products and those 
who operate them on behalf of the purchasers, which can be 
individual consumers with personal uses or business entities in 
a business-to-business setting.
Part III then discusses special liability issues associated with IoT devic-
es, which incorporate AI artifacts into a variety of household and consumer 
products. This analysis reveals that the liability risks associated with certain 
types of AI for certain AI actors are predictable and understandable, while
others are inherently unforeseeable and unknown, and thus are uninsurable. 
This has significant implications for the current and future development of 
AI artifacts, as discussed in Part IV.
Part IV considers how the absence of clear liability standards (a legal 
responsibility gap) might impact the development of AI in the private sec-
tor. It notes that the various actors in the AI value chain will seek to allocate 
liability and indemnity risks among themselves through purchasing con-
tracts or intellectual property license regimes. This may mean that only the 
largest companies will be able to take on the potentially unlimited liability 
risk at issue. This in turn may stifle AI entrepreneurship at smaller scales or 
channel innovation to the types of AI artifacts most suitable to the needs of 
large corporate concerns.
Part IV also considers the role played by ethics in the use and develop-
ment of AI. It discusses a new research study on the perceived responsibility 
of AI professionals in the development and use of AI innovations. This 
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study reveals a clear gap in ethical responsibility—namely, that although 
nearly everyone agrees that ethics and responsibility are critically important 
in AI innovation, nearly everyone also agrees that ethics and responsibility 
are someone else’s job. Part IV then discusses the implications of the legal 
and ethical responsibility gaps in AI innovation and offers recommenda-
tions to address them. Part V concludes with final thoughts and topics for 
future consideration.
II. Types of Artificial Intelligence
As discussed herein, AI refers to computational algorithms based on 
statistical and logical principles emulating human cognitive processes to 
engage in data-driven tasks: acquiring and processing data, actuating physi-




[T]o be considered [AI] . . . a computer system or robot must meet 
certain benchmarks: it must (1) communicate using natural lan-
guage, (2) store information, (3) engage in automated reasoning 
(i.e., logic) to evaluate stored information to answer inquiries, (4) 
adapt to new situations and extrapolate patterns, (5) contain com-
puter vision, and (6) include robotics functions.
37
AI creates value by emulating human cognitive processes, mainly those 
rooted in quantitative analysis and logic in narrow settings. All other cogni-
tive processes, particularly those rooted in gut feeling, intuition, and emo-
tion, are well beyond the capabilities of the most sophisticated AI systems. 
Common innovations in AI technology thus broadly fall into the categories 
of computer vision, virtual agents, natural language processing, autonomous 
vehicles, or smart robotics.
38
The most complex AI systems frequently in-
corporate multiple types of AI innovations and combine them with other 
technologies into comprehensive solutions. However, for analytic purposes 
here, we posit three primary classifications of AI according to its function: 
automation, augmentation, and autonomy.
36. See Scherer, supra note 30, at 360 (noting eight different functional definitions of 
AI “organized into four categories: thinking humanly, acting humanly, thinking rationally, 
and acting rationally. Over time, the importance of each of these definitional concepts has 
waxed and waned within the AI research community.”).
37. Nancy B. Talley, Imagining the Use of Intelligent Agents and Artificial Intelligence 
in Academic Law Libraries, 108 L. LIBR. J. 383, 387 (2016) (citing STUART J. RUSSELL &
PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 2–3 (2d ed. 2003)).
38. See Artificial Intelligence News, BUS. INSIDER, https://www.businessinsider.com
/artificial-intelligence (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) (discussing various developments and trends 
in AI).
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Automation AI has found a home in production lines and warehouses, 
where many tasks are repetitive and fully identified in advance. It is also 
finding its way into white-collar settings, where its information processing 
capabilities help knowledge workers in decision-making processes.
39
As AI 
learns to deal with complexity and uncertainty, it becomes increasingly 
helpful in the completion of ambiguous tasks, which includes dealing with 
humans in unstructured contexts. Sales chatbots are an example of automa-
tion, as they replace known and repetitive activities traditionally completed 
by salespeople using a text-based interface.
40
Factory assembly and ware-
house storage and retrieval robots are additional examples.
41
Augmentation AI helps workers to recall and analyze data or perform 
precision tasks, leaving judgment and strategizing to a human counterpart.
42
Workers in industrial settings, for example, find information aids on aug-
mented reality helmets in support of their decisions.
43
So do players of the 
augmented reality game Pokémon Go. Often, augmentation AI is far more 
sophisticated and high stakes, as for example when surgery is assisted by 
the Da Vinci surgical robot.
44
Nevertheless, the surgeon remains squarely in 
control, albeit with the physician’s capabilities augmented (enhanced) by 
the AI artifact.
45
Autonomy AI will be the inevitable result of AI gaining the ability to 
deal with unstructured data and complex environments. Emerging examples 
include delivery robots and “Level 4” (i.e., fully autonomous) self-driving 
vehicles,
46
although autonomous AI today remains far from the hypothetical 
39. See, e.g., Arup Das, There’s a Bot for That, A.B.A.: L. PRACT. TODAY (Dec. 14, 
2018), https://www.lawpracticetoday.org/article/lawyers-robotic-process-automation (discuss-
ing use of robotic process automation in legal practice).
40. See, e.g., Steven Brykman, Why We Desperately Need an AI Chatbot Law, Before 
We All Get Taken for a Ride, CIO: THE BRYKMAN PREDICAMENT (June 13, 2018, 8:53 AM), 
https://www.cio.com/article/3281375/why-we-desperately-need-an-ai-chatbot-law.html.
41. See, e.g., Nick Wingfield, As Amazon Pushes Forward with Robots, Workers Find 
New Roles, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/10
/technology/amazon-robots-workers.html.
42. MIT TECH. REV. INSIGHTS, Augmenting Human Intelligence, MIT TECH. REV.
(June 13, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601678/augmenting-human-
intelligence.
43. See Garrett Reim, Augmented Reality Helmet Heads into Industrial, L.A. BUS. J.
(Sept. 2, 2016), https://labusinessjournal.com/news/2016/sep/02/augmented-reality-helmet-
heads-industrial.
44. See Tim Lane, A Short History of Robotic Surgery, 100 ANNALS ROYAL COLL.
SURGEONS ENG. 5–7 (Supp. 2018).
45. See Sumathi Reddy, Robot-Assisted Surgery Costs More but May Not Be Better,
WALL ST. J.: YOUR HEALTH (Oct. 30, 2017, 1:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robot-
assisted-surgery-costs-more-but-may-not-be-better-1509383463.
46. See Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 3, at 344 (“Level 4: Full Self-Driving Auto-
mation. The vehicle is designed to perform all safety-critical driving functions and monitor 
roadway conditions for an entire trip. Such a design anticipates that the driver will provide 
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broad AI—the one capable of completing numerous cognitive tasks and 
called artificial general intelligence (AGI).
The differences between the three types of AI artifacts are summarized 
in Table 1:
Table 1. Comparison of AI Automation, Augmentation and 
Autonomy.
Automation Augmentation Autonomy





AI artifact supports 




AI artifact operates by 
following its 
programming, learning 
from its experiences, 
and adapting to new 
circumstances.
Scope of action Replaces humans in 
known & understood 
activities. Can be 
applied to scenarios not 
yet contemplated but 
which are understood. 
Supports humans in 
efficiently completing 
known & understood 
activities, discovering 
new information, 
patterns & connections; 
helping to find solutions 
to problems which are 





anticipated or novel 
scenarios (known-
unknowns). Can learn 




Direct supervision of 
operational process and 
outputs of the AI 
artifact. 
Limited visibility into 
the operational 
processes completed by 
the AI artifact. Outputs 
of the AI artifact are 
considered by the 
human.
No visibility into the 
operational processes 
completed by the AI 
artifact. Outputs of the
AI artifact impact the 
human as the 
anticipated or 




Error types and rates can be estimated. Error types and rates 
cannot be anticipated 
in novel scenarios. 
destination or navigation input, but is not expected to be available for control at any time dur-
ing the trip. This includes both occupied and unoccupied vehicles.”).
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III. Legal Responsibility Frameworks
When it comes to “defective” products,
47
liability in any category (in-
novator, provider, user) will be based on three primary grounds: (i) when 
the product created deviates from its intended design (manufacturing de-
fect), (ii) when the product should have been designed differently to avoid a 
foreseeable risk of harm (design defect), or (iii) when companies fail to pro-
vide instructions or warnings that could have avoided foreseeable risks of 
harm (failure to warn).
48
In all three cases, the plaintiff will assert that the 
product in question was “unreasonably dangerous”
49
due to a defect of some 
kind.
50
Each involves a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the product 
and injury in question, as well as the circumstances in which the injury oc-
curred.
51
Manufacturing defects (for which companies are strictly liable)
52
occur 
when products do not comport with the manufacturer’s intended design 
(e.g., if a data processing or coding error causes the AI to behave differently 
than it should).
53
The basis of liability is the product itself, which necessari-
ly includes all of its component parts. Manufacturers thus can be held liable 
for product defects, even where the defect arises from a component manu-
factured by others.
54
However, in these cases the incorporated component 
itself must actually be defective. The original creator of the component is 
47. There must be some cost or injury beyond the loss associated with the product itself 
not meeting specifications. See, e.g., Sacramento Reg’l Transit Dist. v. Grumman Flxible, 158 
Cal. App. 3d 289, 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a merchant could not assert a claim 
“in products liability for physical injury to its property where that injury consists of nothing 
more than the product defect upon which liability is founded”).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1998).
49. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 1000 n.7 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (AM. L. INST. 1965))
(noting that “[u]nder traditional tort principles, the seller of a defective, ‘unreasonably dan-
gerous’ product may be liable to an injured user if the product ‘is expected to and does reach 
the user . . . without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.’”).
50. “Whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is a distinct inquiry and must be 
established whether the claim is based on a manufacturing defect, a design defect, or a defec-
tive warning.” Kaiser v. Johnson & Johnson, 947 F.3d 996, 1008 (7th Cir. 2020).
51. See, e.g., id. (quoting Koske v. Townsend Eng’g Co., 551 N.E.2d 437, 440–41 (Ind. 
1990)) (“To decide whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, the fact-finder may consider 
several factors, including ‘the reasonably anticipated knowledge, perception, appreciation, 
circumstances, and behavior of expected users.’”).
52. Gregory C. Keating, Products Liability as Enterprise Liability, 10 J. TORT L. 41, 95 
(2017) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a) (“Under both 
§402A and the Third Restatement, liability for manufacturing defects is strict enterprise liabil-
ity.”).
53. Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 
1709 (2003).
54. See, e.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1296 (9th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that “[a] seller is strictly liable for injuries caused by a defective product even though the 
defect originated from a component part manufactured by another party”).
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not liable for injuries subsequently caused when another product manufac-
turer makes the poor choice to incorporate a component and task it to do 
something for which it is ill-suited.
55
Design defects, on the other hand, occur when there is no deviation 
from the manufacturing plan but where the design itself is flawed or the 
product could have been designed more carefully to lessen the risk of using 
it.
56
Design defects can be established in one of two ways. The first option 
allows plaintiffs to recover by showing that “the product failed to perform 
as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or 
reasonably foreseeable manner” (known as the “consumer expectations 
test”).
57
Plaintiffs can prove their case using circumstantial evidence of how 
the product behaved in a particular situation to show that it must have been 
defective when causing their harm.
58
Alternatively, plaintiffs can establish a design defect by proving that a 
product should have been designed more safely in light of “the gravity of 
the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger 
would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the fi-
nancial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the 
product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design”
(known as the “risk-benefit” test).
59
This test seeks to balance commercial 
and consumer interests. As one court described it:
A “risk-utility” analysis best protects both the manufacturer and the 
consumer. It does not create a duty on the manufacturer to create a 
completely safe product. Creating such a product is often impossi-
ble or prohibitively expensive. Instead, a manufacturer is charged 
with the duty to make its product reasonably safe, regardless of 
whether the plaintiff is aware of the product’s dangerousness.
60
Finally, manufacturers have a duty to warn about the risks associated 
with using their products. The duty arises “when the manufacturer ‘knows 
55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 5 cmt. a (“If the component 
is not itself defective, it would be unjust and inefficient to impose liability solely on the 
ground” that others “utiliz[e] the component in a manner that renders the integrated product 
defective.”).
56. Id.; see also Estate of Alex v. T-Mobile US, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 723, 732 (N.D. 
Tex. 2018) (holding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged claim of design defect under Texas law 
by alleging that mobile device software was defectively designed because it failed to guard 
against software tampering that caused 9-1-1 telecommunications system to be congested and 
led to calls based on real emergencies, like babysitter’s call regarding injured child, to be 
placed on hold).
57. Bookhamer v. Sunbeam Prods., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 809, 818 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(citing Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457 (Cal. 1978)).
58. Id. (citing Barker, 573 P.2d at 454).
59. Id. (citing Barker, 573 P.2d at 455).
60. Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 256 (Miss. 1993) (footnote omit-
ted).
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or has reason to know’ that its product ‘is or is likely to be dangerous for the 
use for which it is supplied’ and the manufacturer ‘has no reason to believe’
that the product’s users will realize that danger.”
61
This duty to warn ex-
tends only to the known aspects of the product itself—not to unanticipated 
situations where one company’s product is incorporated into another’s
product in an unexpected way.
62
Tort liability for defective products also can be predicated on the doc-
trine of negligence. “In plain English, a person suing for negligence alleges 
that the defendant owed her a duty of reasonable care and injured her by 
breaching that duty.”
63
Although negligence claims likely would play a role 
in lawsuits arising out of defective AI artifacts,
64
in order to facilitate a 
sharper focus on the product itself, negligence theories and contractual war-
ranties under the Uniform Commercial Code
65
are not discussed further 
here. This is not to say that such alternative claims are unimportant. Indeed, 
it is a virtual certainty that claims arising under all three theories would be 
asserted simultaneously in any lawsuit arising out of an AI artifact.
66
How-
61. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 993 (2019) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388). “[W]arnings also may be needed to inform users 
and consumers of nonobvious and not generally known risks that unavoidably inhere in using 
or consuming the product.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2, cmt. I. Users also may 
have to be advised when there are safer ways to use a product. See, e.g., Liriano v. Hobart 
Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 270–71 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing two categories of required warn-
ings—the first covering the ways in which a product may be dangerous and the second in-
structing on safer ways to use that dangerous product).
62. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 993–94 (2019) (noting “foreseeability that 
the product may be used with another product or part that is likely to be dangerous is not 
enough to trigger a duty to warn. But a manufacturer does have a duty to warn when its prod-
uct requires incorporation of a part and the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the 
integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses.”).
63. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the 
Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 658 (2001).
64. Broadly speaking, “[t]ort law imposes ‘a duty to exercise reasonable care’ on those 
whose conduct presents a risk of harm to others.” Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 993 
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 (AM. L. INST.
2010)).
65. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) [hereinafter 
U.C.C.] (on third party beneficiaries of warranties express or implied); see also U.C.C. §§ 2-
313 (express warranties), 2-314 (implied warranties of merchantability), 2-315 (implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose), 2-316 (governing how warranties can be modified 
and disclaimed). For more details on contractual liability, see Timothy Davis, UCC Breach of 
Warranty and Contract Claims: Clarifying the Distinction, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 783 (2009) 
(addressing “the distinction between breach of warranty and breach of contract claims” under 
the UCC); see also William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-
Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions That Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-
318 (Alternatives B & C), 27 AKRON L. REV. 197 (1993) (discussing warranty claims and de-
fenses under Article 2 of the UCC).
66. Claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by sophisticated medical de-
vices are a good analogy. See, e.g., Tyree v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 54 F. Supp. 3d 501, 515 (S.D. W. 
Va. 2014) (plaintiff’s complaint alleging negligence, strict liability for design and manufactur-
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ever, there are a number of analytic benefits to focusing more precisely here 
on strict liability and leaving it to future scholarship to address the applica-
tion of other compensation doctrines to AI artifacts.
First, the focus on strict products liability law makes it unnecessary to 
contemplate the separate but critical question of whether a legal “duty” ex-
ists for AI-related activities under common law or legislation. Duty is a pre-
requisite for all negligence claims,
67
and the scope of that duty is critical in 
determining whether the compensation gateway remains open or closed.
68
But it is not necessary here to get bogged down in the theoretical quagmire 
of where a legal duty might come from in relation to AI artifacts (meaning, 
whether the duty is an outgrowth of traditional tort principles or some other 
form of sui generis evolution).69
Second, the focus on strict liability eliminates the challenges associated 
with contractual disclaimers
70
as well as the complications that can arise 
when multiple causes of action “become entangled with the structure of 
products liability actions and with different limitation periods and accrual 
rules applying to warranty, strict products liability and negligence ac-
tions.”
71
This allows for more analytic consistency across different types of 
AI artifacts.
Finally, the focus on strict liability alone presents the clearest oppor-
tunity for policy consideration of the potential benefits and drawbacks of 
widespread AI innovation and adoption. Strict products liability focuses on 
ing defects, strict liability for failure to warn, and breach of express warranty); McPhee v. 
DePuy Orthopedics, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 451, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (alternative claims in-
cluding strict liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties).
67. See, e.g., Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 158, 164–65
(E.D.N.Y. 2019) (holding that it was necessary for a plaintiff to establish that the defendant 
owed the plaintiff a legal duty before the defendant could be held liable for negligence).
68. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1671, 1672 (2007) (summarizing the traditional formulation of the elements of a negligence 
claim—duty, breach, causation, and damages).
69. For example, whether Autonomous AI can have its own legal obligations. See, e.g.,
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 
1248–53 (1992) (in the context of capacity to uphold legal duties associated with trust admin-
istration, noting that an AI artifact could not be deemed to sufficiently capable of exercising 
judgment and discretion for purposes of legal liability unless it was proven capable of re-
sponding capably to unexpected changes in circumstance, exercising proper moral judgment 
and fairness, and making good decisions in the resolution of legal issues and disputes). For 
updated consideration of Solum’s early theories and predictions, see generally Dina Moussa 
& Garrett Windle, From Deep Blue to Deep Learning: A Quarter Century of Progress for 
Artificial Minds, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 72 (2016).
70. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Implied Warranty, Products Liability, and the Boundary 
Between Contract and Tort, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 469 (1997) (noting distinctions between im-
plied warranty and products liability standards).
71. Samuel J. M. Donnelly & Mary Ann Donnelly, Commercial Law, 47 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 379, 398 (1997).
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whether a product—negligently designed or not
72
—is “unreasonably dan-




When products are involved, negligence liability is liability for 
harms that would not have happened given reasonably safe product 
design and reasonable product warnings. By contrast, enterprise li-
ability is liability for harms that flow from an activity’s (or an en-
terprise’s) characteristic risks, whether or not those risks should 
have been eliminated through the exercise of reasonable care.
74
This places the focus squarely on the risks associated with the inherent 
nature of AI artifacts themselves, together with the behavior that the law 
should require innovators, providers, and users to engage in in order to mit-
igate those risks.
A. Products Liability Law and AI Artifacts
The question of assessing legal responsibility for AI innovations is im-
portant because the law is currently poised to fall behind technological re-
ality, if it hasn’t done so already. As discussed below, the liability risks as-
sociated with certain types of AI will be inherently unforeseeable. The 
various participants in the AI value chain undoubtedly will seek to allocate 
potential liability risks among themselves through purchasing contracts or 
intellectual property licensing regimes. They cannot, however, limit their 
collective liability when an AI artifact causes an indivisible harm to a third 
party outside the value chain.
Fundamental differences in the three primary categories of AI artifacts 
discussed above will lead to different types of legal responsibility for firms
involved in bringing them to market. When a defective product causes 
harm, the law generally seeks to apportion liability based upon the relative 
fault of the actors involved (which includes injured parties who contribute 
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) (providing for liability even 
where “the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product”).
73. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) 
(holding that a party need not prove negligence to recover in products liability; rather, a plain-
tiff need only establish that a product was “defective” and that the defect caused the injuries in 
question). See also Keating, supra note 52, at 80 (discussing liability for selling a “product in 
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer”) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)).
74. Keating, supra note 52, at 78. Absolute safety is not required. See, e.g., Miller v. 
Dvornik, 501 N.E.2d 160, 165 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (refusing to hold motorcycle manufacturer 
liable for injuries from vehicle accident because the injuries in question arose from the inher-
ent risks in operating a motorcycle, which were obvious to the user).
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to their own injuries—say, by misusing a product).
75
An important consider-
ation is which parties were best positioned to prevent the harm in the first 
place—typically the product’s creators and sellers.
76
All of the actors in a 




• Creators/designers of a product or suppliers of component parts 
provided to manufacturers;
• Product manufacturers, who select and assemble a variety of 
component parts according to specific designs in order to cre-
ate a product that meets a specific market need; and
• Distributors and retailers, ranging from mere sellers of “boxed”
products from manufacturers (e.g., retailers), to players with a 
specific role in “prepping” the product for market and selling 
end users on its benefits (e.g., car dealers), to purveyors of so-
phisticated equipment who are heavily involved in helping us-
ers with product selection and in educating them on proper use 
(e.g., medical devices).
78
Products liability theories cannot be used to secure compensation from 
end-users or the occasional seller.
79
In cases where third parties are injured, 
claims against owners, who held either title or a leasehold interest in the 
product at the time it causes injury, and operators, who actually were using 
the product at the time the injury occurs, most likely would be brought un-
der a negligence theory. This makes sense because any wrongful conduct 
that owners and operators engage in relates to how the product was main-
tained and/or used at the time of the accident, rather than how the product 
was designed or manufactured. In a similar vein, negligence would play 
some role in the apportionment of liability when human error combines 
75. See, e.g., Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 256 (Miss. 1993) (“In 
balancing the utility of the product against the risk it creates, an ordinary person’s ability to 
avoid the danger by exercising care is also weighed.”).
76. See, e.g., Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901 (noting that the purpose of imposing strict 
liability is “to insure [sic] that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne 
by the manufacturer that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons 
who are powerless to protect themselves.”).
77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. c (“One engaged in 
the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective 
product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”). While 
the focus here is on U.S. law, similar rules apply in other countries—throughout Europe, for 
example. See Council Directive 85/374, art. 6, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 (EC) (“A product is de-
fective when it does not provide the safety a person is entitled to expect.”).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (noting that liability “ap-
plies to any person engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption. It 
therefore applies to any manufacturer of such a product, to any wholesaler or retail dealer or 
distributor”).
79. See id.
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with a defective AI artifact to cause harm (as with the distracted driver in 
the Uber case discussed below,
80
where the driver was using her mobile 
phone at the time of the crash).
81
For purposes of analytic clarity, a simplified liability chain is offered 
here to focus more precisely on three primary types of actors in connection 
with products constituting AI artifacts: innovators, providers, and users.
82
Under this scheme, products liability theories would apply only to innova-
tors and providers in relation to defective AI artifacts. Although separated 
here for analytical purposes, it is important to bear in mind that the devel-
opment of AI artifacts can be achieved through either centralized or highly 
distributed processes. In practice, a single company even could play all 
three roles—innovating, producing, and using AI artifacts. Google parent 
company Alphabet’s “moonshot factory,”
83
for example, has internal labora-










combating threats to geopolitical instability,
88
and even creating 
human-level artificial intelligence.
89
All of these various projects provide 
feedback, learning, and user information that Alphabet then uses to innovate 
further in many different realms.
The development of AI artifacts proceeds through a variety of highly 
discrete actors who may range from high school students to professionals, 
with coding taking place in settings as diverse as corporate plants, garages, 
and even dorm rooms. These actors may participate in the development pro-
80. See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Tom Krisher, Safety Agency Says Distracted Driver Caused Fatal Uber 
Crash, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 18, 2019, 11:51 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/business
/articles/2019-11-19/official-safety-lacking-before-uber-self-driving-car-crash.
82. These terms were defined above. See supra p. 62.
83. See Dereck Thompson, Google X and the Science of Radical Creativity, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/11/x-google-moonshot-
factory/540648 (discussing Alphabet’s “moonshot factory”).
84. E.g., Tom Simonite, Alphabet’s Dream of an ‘Everyday Robot’ Is Just Out of 
Reach, WIRED (Nov. 21, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/alphabets-dream-
everyday-robot-out-reach (innovation on general purpose robots who could be tasked any-
thing from helping the elderly to sorting trash).
85. E.g., Andrew J. Hawkins, Inside Waymo’s Strategy to Grow the Best Brains for 
Self-Driving Cars, VERGE (May 9, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com
/2018/5/9/17307156/google-waymo-driverless-cars-deep-learning-neural-net-interview.
86. E.g., Tom Simonite & Gregory Barber, Alphabet’s AI Might Be Able to Predict 
Kidney Disease, WIRED (July 31, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/alphabets-ai-
predict-kidney-disease.
87. E.g., Quantum, GOOGLE RSCH., https://research.google/teams/applied-
science/quantum (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
88. E.g., Jigsaw, GOOGLE, https://jigsaw.google.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
89. E.g., Jeremy Kahn, Inside Big Tech’s Quest for Human-Level A.I., FORTUNE (Jan. 
20, 2020, 3:30 AM), https://fortune.com/longform/ai-artificial-intelligence-big-tech-
microsoft-alphabet-openai.
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cess through a broad range of ventures, belonging to different organizations 
or no organizations at all—even contributing anonymously. The contribu-
tions may involve discrete work and custom designed code or modifications 
of AI components developed by others contained in open-source libraries. 
All of this builds considerable opacity into the operations of complex sys-
tems powered by AI artifacts, especially where the interactions of the vari-
ous AI components are not fully understood or transparent to users or regu-
lators, or even to the innovators creating them or the providers bringing 
them to market.
90
The three AI value chain categories mapped against the traditional 
products liability categories appear in Table 2.
90. See Scherer, supra note 30, at 369–72 (discussing diversity, diffusion, discretion 
and opacity in AI development).
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Table 2. AI Value Chain Categories Mapped Against 
Traditional Liability Categories.











































Uses the product to 
fulfill a certain 
business or personal 
need/desire
Amazon 





controlling product at 








Some have suggested an additional player for products liability claims 
specific to AI: allowing claims against the AI artifact itself or against a 
product incorporating that artifact. For example, if my friend’s butler robot 
crushes my fingers when it returns my car keys after dinner, I could sue the 
robot itself—just as I would a human being. Such proposals include things 
like giving AI artifacts formal legal personality, similar to the type given to 
corporations that enable them to be sued in courts,
91
or even more broadly 
conceiving of AI algorithms as “citizens,” which would create duties for in-
91. David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial In-
telligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 124 (2014) (“there is no a priori reason why truly autono-
mous machines should not be accorded some formal legal status, making them, like corpora-
tions and certain trusts, ‘persons’ in the eyes of the law and thus subject to suit.”).
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novators and providers to “‘raise’ their AIs to act as responsible, productive 
members of society.”
92
This category is not considered here for two reasons. First, while theo-
retically intriguing, this category of liability is not yet recognized in law
93
and thus is of little help to innovators and providers making decisions in to-
day’s uncertain environment. Second, these categorizations are conceptually 
dissimilar to the other participants in the value chain. They often amount to 
semantic shorthand for a risk-shifting policy mandate (e.g., requiring insur-
ance on self-driving cars that moves with the vehicle itself, thus enabling 
the crash victims to “sue the car” in order to access the insurance).
94
Even 
the “algorithm as citizen” notion really amounts to a mandate for companies 
to design their AI responsibly and to ensure that their creations do not 
breach important social covenants.
B. AI Artifacts and the Internet of Things
The linkage of AI artifacts and the kinetic world through the IoT has the 
potential to drastically change our conception of what exactly the “product”
in “product liability” is. The IoT takes the virtual world and makes it tangi-
ble. Consider just the problem presented by the more than 278 million pas-
senger cars on the road today in the United States.
95
Modern cars contain 
50–100 sensors constantly monitoring and recording everything from speed 
and fuel consumption to tire pressure.
96
The failure of any number of these 
instruments, or certain combinations of failures, could cause an accident and 
personal injury to the driver, passengers, or other motorists or pedestrians. 
That said, when there is an instrument failure, the root cause of an accident 
relating to the device failure in question often is traceable back to a particu-
lar component part or that part’s manufacturer.
97
The harder challenge arises not when a sophisticated component is 
physically defective, but rather when there is either a problem with the AI 
artifact operating that component or when AI software interacts with that 
92. ACCENTURE, TECHNOLOGY VISION FOR ORACLE 5 (2018), 
https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-77/Accenture-Technology-Vision-Oracle-2018.
93. As the court noted in United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 979 
(3d Cir. 1984), “robots cannot be sued, but they can cause devastating damage,” such that “the 
defendant . . . was twice sued as the ultimate responsible distributor for various violations of 
the Consumer Product Safety Act.”
94. Vladeck, supra note 91, at 124 n.27.
95. Nathan Bomey, Old Cars Everywhere: Average Vehicle Age Hits All-Time High,
USA TODAY (June 28, 2019, 1:06 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars
/2019/06/28/average-vehicle-age-ihs-markit/1593764001.
96. J. Murgoitio & J. I. Fernández, Car Driver Monitoring by Networking Vital Data,
in ADVANCED MICROSYSTEMS FOR AUTOMOTIVE APPLICATIONS 37, 38 (Jürgen Valldorf & 
Wolfgang Gessner eds., 2008).
97. See, e.g., in re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., 396 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (S.D. Fla. 
2019) (consolidated class action claims arising out of defective airbags installed in vehicles).
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component in a way that makes it behave in an unexpected manner. In such 
complex systems, “[t]he various component parts and their respective roles 
in causing a malfunction may be hard to discern and separate for the pur-
pose of assigning responsibility.”
98
This is not to suggest that AI-related causation—and the interaction be-
tween AI artifacts and physical components—can never be proven. For ex-
ample, a self-driving Uber SUV that struck and killed a pedestrian in Tem-
pe, Arizona, in March 2018 was equipped with a camera as well as radar 
and LIDAR systems.
99
These components worked properly at the time of the 
accident, but the algorithm running them did not recognize a woman walk-
ing across the street with her bicycle outside of a crosswalk as a jaywalking 
pedestrian, and thus did not activate the braking system until it was too late 
to stop.
100
In a similar situation, a man was killed in a Tesla vehicle operat-
ing in auto-pilot mode when the vehicle struck an eighteen-wheeler after the 
system failed to distinguish the white truck from the bright sky.
101
Neither of 
these vehicles was truly autonomous, and thus both would be classified as 
augmentation AI as they both provided driver assistance, rather than being 
trusted to do all of the actual driving.
In both of these instances, the AI operating the self-driving vehicle was 
found to be at fault for the crash. The problems with the AI artifacts in ques-
tion
102
were identified by government agencies tasked with post-accident 
98. Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between Autono-
mous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1328 (2012) (dis-
cussing autonomous vehicle systems).
99. Richard Gonzales, Feds Say Self-Driving Uber SUV Did Not Recognize Jaywalking 
Pedestrian in Fatal Crash, NPR (Nov. 7, 2019, 10:57 PM), https://www.npr.org
/2019/11/07/777438412/feds-say-self-driving-uber-suv-did-not-recognize-jaywalking-
pedestrian-in-fatal-.
100. NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., VEHICLE AUTOMATION REPORT, TEMPE, AZ, NTSB
NO. AZ-HWY-18-MH-010, 11–12 (2019), https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/62500-62999
/62978/629713.pdf; see also Hannah Knowles, Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Had a Major Flaw: 
They Weren’t Programmed to Stop for Jaywalkers, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2019, 10:06 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2019/11/06/ubers-self-driving-cars-had-
major-flaw-they-werent-programmed-stop-jaywalkers. A separate lawsuit was brought against 
the city for allegedly creating the appearance of a safe crossing area that led directly into traf-
fic. Patrick O’Grady, Tempe Faces $10M Suit in Uber Self-Driving Death, PHX. BUS. J. (Feb 
3, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/news/2019/02/03/tempe-faces-10m-
suit-in-uber-self-driving-death.html.
101. Danny Yadron & Dan Tynan, Tesla Driver Dies in First Fatal Crash While Using 
Autopilot Mode, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2016, 7:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2016/jun/30/tesla-autopilot-death-self-driving-car-elon-musk. Two other acci-
dents involving Tesla’s auto-drive feature are under investigation at the time of writing. Alex-
ander B. Lemann, Autonomous Vehicles, Technological Progress, and the Scope Problem in 
Products Liability, 12 J. TORT L. 157, 169–70 (2019) (providing details of two other Tesla 
crashes).
102. Major IoT risks—both of which seem to apply to the Uber and Tesla crashes—
involve “sensor perception and decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.” See Mat-
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investigation. The full power of the U.S. government—acting through the 
National Transportation Safety Board’s investigatory branches —was
brought to bear in sorting out causation. Establishing the root causes of al-
leged failures by AI artifacts in cases that do not command the attention of 
powerful government agencies will be a much harder and more costly prop-
osition.
103
Although the AI artifacts often will be involved in IoT-powered device 
failures,
104
proving exactly what went wrong with an AI artifact will become 
increasingly difficult as its complexity increases. Traditional concepts of 
foreseeability already are hard to apply because “an AI system’s solution 
may deviate substantially from the solution typically produced by human 
cognitive processes. The AI’s solution thus may not have been foreseeable 
to a human — even the human that designed the AI.”
105
And these are just 
the problems that exist with machine learning around narrowly defined but 
still complex tasks (e.g., processing data from a combination of radar, 
LIDAR, and camera inputs and ascertaining whether a vehicle should sud-
denly brake because a pedestrian or large truck lies is in the way). The prob-
lem will become exponentially worse as AI transitions from automation and 
augmentation and AI autonomy becomes a reality:
[T]he possibility that an autonomous system will make choices oth-
er than those predicted and encouraged by its programmers is in-
herent in the claim that it is autonomous. If it has sufficient auton-
omy that it learns from its experience and surroundings then it may 
make decisions which reflect these as much, or more than, its initial 
programming. The more the system is autonomous then the more it 
has the capacity to make choices other than those predicted or en-
couraged by its programmers.
106
thew Michaels Moore & Beverly Lu, Autonomous Vehicles for Personal Transport: A Tech-
nology Assessment (June 2, 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1865047.
103. See Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and 
Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1270 (2012) (“For a plaintiff 
to reach a jury on a design-defect claim, she may have to engage in a searching review of the 
computer code that directs the movement of these vehicles. This project may be difficult, and 
expensive.”).
104. See, e.g., Marchant & Lindor, supra note 98, at 1328 (noting, for example, that “the 
malfunction in an autonomous vehicle will usually be a programming error or system fail-
ure.”).
105. Scherer, supra note 30, at 365.
106. Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 62, 70 (2007) (discussing AI in 
the context of LAWS—Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems). See also Scherer, supra note 
30, at 365 (noting that “the development of more versatile AI systems combined with advanc-
es in machine learning make it all but certain that issues pertaining to unforeseeable AI behav-
ior will crop up with increasing frequency and that the unexpectedness of AI behavior will 
rise significantly.”).
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Causation may be even more difficult to establish in the not-too-distant 
future where AI artifacts become intimately involved in creating other AI 
artifacts along with designing and building other products that cause injury 
after release into the stream of commerce.
107
Although cases involving AI artifacts certainly will be novel—
particularly with autonomous AI—the use of traditional strict products lia-
bility principles to determine liability and set compensation in such cases is 
sound as a matter of public policy. Innovators and providers utilizing AI ar-
tifacts have special duties to society as a whole.
108
The major justification 
for imposing strict liability is that these actors are in the best position to 
avoid the potential for harm in the first place and subsequently to pass on 
and spread the cost of compensating victims for their injuries.
109
That said, it is important to note that the theoretical linkage between 
fault, prevention, and payments for injuries is at best imperfect. When mul-
tiple tortfeasors create a single indivisible harm (which usually is the case 
when a defective product hurts someone), the law generally holds each of 
them “jointly and severally liable.” This means that the injured party can 
recover the full amount of damages from any of them, regardless of that in-
dividual defendant’s actual percentage of fault.
110
Plaintiffs’ lawyers thus 
will seek to assert claims against all companies or individuals involved—
however slightly—in the creation and delivery chain that brought the defec-
tive product into contact with the injured party.
The plaintiff’s lawyer’s target zone thus will include all identifiable in-
novators, providers, and users that can be linked to the injury in question. 
Note also that with sophisticated products, such as self-driving cars, there 
may be multiple parties in each category—numerous AI innovators whose 
algorithms and systems are incorporated into an AI artifact created by a 
provider that in turn may be aggregated with other products in the activities 
of given owners or operators.
107. In a statement more rhetorical flourish than realistic description, Tesla’s Elon Musk 
has called his largely automated manufacturing facility (the Gigafactory) a “machine that 
builds the machine.” Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla, Inc., quoted in Sean O’Kane, Tesla Will Live 
and Die by the Gigafactory, VERGE (Nov. 30, 2018, 10:01 AM), https://www.theverge.com
/transportation/2018/11/30/18118451/tesla-gigafactory-nevada-video-elon-musk-jobs-model-
3.
108. “The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the special responsibility for the safety 
of the public undertaken by one who enters into the business of supplying human beings with 
products which may endanger the safety of their persons and property, and the forced reliance 
upon that undertaking on the part of those who purchase such goods.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) cmt. f.
109. See, e.g., Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1165–69 (Cal. 1978) (discuss-
ing policy justifications for strict liability).
110. See, e.g., Chase v. Roy, 363 N.E.2d 402, 408 (Mass. 1973) (“[I]f two or more 
wrongdoers negligently contribute to the personal injury of another by their several acts, 
which operate concurrently, so that in effect the damages suffered are rendered inseparable, 
they are jointly and severally liable.”).
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In any case, once a presumably-blameless
111
injured plaintiff is fully 
compensated, all of the various defendants then will assert legal claims 
against each other to apportion damages based on each defendant’s relative 
contribution to the overall harm.
112
Such contribution and indemnity claims 
have significant limitations. A party that had a minimal role in the product 
containing the defective AI artifact but which is financially well-heeled can 
be left holding the proverbial bag for the entire group if the other defendants 
lack insurance, go bankrupt, or benefit from a statutory liability cap—as in 
the case of many universities
113
—that make them unable to contribute their 
pro rata share.
IV. Implications for the Development and Deployment of 
AI Artifacts
A. Liability Implications—Impacts on AI Innovation
As discussed above, in addition to the three actors (innovators, provid-
ers, and users) in the value chain for AI artifacts, AI also can be character-
ized based on its level of sophistication. AI autonomy is markedly different 
than automation and augmentation. The key value proposition of autonomy 
is the machine’s ability to learn from its environment and make its own de-
cisions based on a wide variety of inputs. But its inherent unpredictability 
works against the players in the AI value chain because its autonomy also 
means that unexpected things can go wrong at unexpected times and in un-
expected ways. Put more colloquially, and quoting former U.S. Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: “There are known knowns. There are things we 
know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are 
things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown un-
knowns. There are things we do not know we don’t know.”
114
The liability matrix appears as set out in Table 3.
111. A plaintiff’s recovery may be reduced or even barred outright if the plaintiff is at 
fault for their own harm. See, e.g., Linda J. Rusch, Products Liability Trapped by History: 
Our Choice of Rules Rules Our Choices, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 739, 752 (2003) (“The defenses of 
contributory or comparative responsibility, assumption of the risk and product misuse are also 
used in strict liability cases.”) (internal citations omitted). Product alteration also may bar re-
covery. See, e.g., Davis v. Berwind Corp., 690 A.2d 186, 190–91 (Pa. 1997) (holding that the 
removal of a safety device sufficiently altered the product to act as supervening cause of inju-
ry that relieved manufacturer of liability). But these kinds of misuse themselves are subject to 
a foreseeability test. See, e.g., Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 363 
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (“A manufacturer cannot ignore a probable ‘misuse’ of his product.”).
112. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231B, § 1 (West 2017).
113. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231B, § 85K (West 2017) (limiting liability of 
non-health care charitable organizations to $20,000).
114. Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002), quoted in David 
C. Logan, Known Knowns, Known Unknowns, Unknown Unknowns and the Propagation of 
Scientific Enquiry, 60 J. EXPER. BOTANY 712, 712 (2009).
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The “known unknowns” are relatively easy cases because the role of the 
AI is limited and error rates and types can be predicted. A factory robot that 
punches three holes in a metal plate, rotates it 90 degrees, and moves it 12.5 
centimeters to the left behaves in a fairly predictable way. If it moves 12.5 
centimeters to the right, causing a machine to jam and subsequently break 
apart, injuring the operator, liability can be established in a fairly straight-
forward manner. Indeed, statistics from the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration indicate that “‘dumb robots,’ designed for repetitive tasks 
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that are dirty, dangerous or dull,” are known to kill one to two factory 
workers per year in the United States.
115
Likewise, for example, with surgical AI augmentation for a human doc-
tor. If a robot that is supposed to move only two millimeters instead moves 
five, severing an artery instead of a ligament, we can determine what went 
wrong with relative ease after we factor in the doctor’s conduct and whether 





And, as noted above, investigators have been 
able to determine what happened in those accidents involving the semi-
autonomous Uber and Tesla vehicles.
118
The real problem rests with AI autonomy. When an AI artifact causes 
physical harm that can be traced back to an unknown unknown, or even an 
unknowable one, assuming that accurate forensic analysis is even possible, 
who should bear the costs? In the autonomy zone, the AI artifact teaches it-
self and learns from its unique environment. It therefore may prove nearly 
impossible for innovators, providers, and users to predict the types of errors 
that could occur, the frequency of those errors, whether one error might cas-
cade in a complex system and cause other types of errors, and the ultimate 
type and magnitude of harm that might arise. This means that the usual legal 
paradigms—focused on ensuring that innovators, providers, and users guard 
against foreseeable risks in design and manufacture and warn against fore-
seeable misuses when those risks cannot be avoided—are of little help in 
determining legal responsibility. This is a problem for all three actors, as the 
harm often will prove indivisible, and thus very difficult—as a forensic mat-
ter—to trace back to one particular source.
It is extremely difficult to discover whether software, as opposed to 
hardware, is responsible for the glitch that led to an accident. If the 
software is responsible, it would be hard to determine whether the 
precise cause was the operating system or the application (and, if 
the latter, which application). This analysis is all the more difficult 
115. John Markoff & Claire Cain Miller, As Robotics Advances, Worries of Killer Ro-
bots Rise, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/upshot/danger-
robots-working.html.
116. See, e.g., Sargis v. Donahue, 65 A.3d 20, 25 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (quoting 
Mcchietto v. Keggi, 930 A.2d 817, 821 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007)) (“[T]o prevail in 
a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove (1) the requisite standard of care for 
treatment, (2) a deviation from that standard of care, and (3) a causal connection between the 
deviation and the claimed injury”).
117. See, e.g., Balding v. Tarter, No. 4-12-1030, 2013 WL 4711723, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Aug. 29, 2013) (denying appeal of summary judgment awarded to physician in medical mal-
practice case alleging that plaintiff suffered nerve damage to patient during laparoscopic ro-
botic-assisted prostatectomy due to the surgeon’s lack of familiarity with robotic procedures, 
and hence excessive time necessary to perform the procedure).
118. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
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where the software is open source (since no single author is respon-
sible) and the hardware can be easily modified.
119
Further complications arise with foreseeability when an AI artifact is 
modified, customized, or “taught” to behave in certain ways “because the 
manufacturer could not necessarily anticipate the universe of potential prob-
lems that might stem from third-party innovation and provide warnings or 
modify the platform design in response.
120
Several important consequences follow. First, it is fanciful to suggest 
that simply because harm is unforeseeable, innovators, providers, and users 
would not be held liable for injuries caused by autonomous AI artifacts. 
From a policy perspective, AI value chain participants will be perceived—
rightly or wrongly—as having created the problem in the first place, as best 
positioned to prevent accidents (or at least reduce their frequency and 
costs), and as having the most resources available to compensate injured 
parties.
121
As a legal matter, all innovators and providers involved most likely will 
be held liable in the absence of a legislative mandate or regulatory scheme 
that creates immunity.
122
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (Latin for “the 
thing speaks for itself”) aids injured plaintiffs in situations where the precise 
source of their harm is unclear but control of the harm-causing mechanisms 
rests exclusively in the hands of others.
123
In these cases, courts “infer a de-
fect of some kind on the theory that the accident itself is proof of defect, 
even if there is compelling evidence that cuts against a defect theory.”
124
A related consequence is that the risks associated with autonomous AI 
artifacts may prove impossible—or prohibitively expensive—to insure. Af-
ter all, insurance is predicated on actuarial tables that predict the likelihood 
of events based in part on historical occurrences. But with autonomous AI, 
there are no precedent scenarios, and there is much opacity around causa-
119. M. Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 597 (2011) (internal citations 
omitted).
120. Id. at 596.
121. E.g., Amar Kumar Moolayil, The Modern Trolley Problem: Ethical and Economi-
cally-Sound Liability Schemes for Autonomous Vehicles, 9 CASE W. RES. J. L. & TECH. 1, 20 
(2018) (discussing these issues in the context of self-driving cars).
122. For example, Internet service providers benefit from an immunity from liability for 
defamation and related claims arising out of material posted on their websites. Communica-
tions Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012) (safe harbor provision immunizing Internet 
service providers from liability for third-party content posted on their websites). That said, it 
is unlikely that the public would stand for similar limitations on liability for innovators or 
providers of AI artifacts if physical injuries and property damage were at issue.
123. See, e.g., Moussa & Windle, supra note 69, at 78 (discussing application of res ipsa 
loquitur to AI failures).
124. Vladeck, supra note 91, at 128; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD.
LIAB. § 3(a) (res ipsa loquitur may apply where a product’s failure “was of a kind that ordi-
narily occurs as a product defect”).
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tion, applicable theories of liability, event frequency, and overall damages. 
This likely will deter all but the most adventurous insurers from entering the 
market, at least until some of these parameters become known and thus pre-
dictable for assessing casualty rates, experience histories, and premium cal-
culations. This in turn requires innovators, providers, and users of AI arti-
facts to retain considerable risk in their operations. Two market-facing 
consequences are likely to follow.
First, the risks may discourage smaller players, such as entrepreneurs, 
from entering the market or force existing participants to leave. Things may 
change once the liability rules are clarified, but for now, the potential for 
catastrophic liability may leave the field dominated by only one type of 
company: well-heeled corporations that can absorb considerable losses and 
self-insure against such risks, such as Google, Apple, Facebook, IBM, or 
large manufacturing companies like the “Big 3” automakers in the United 
States.
125
This, in turn, may limit the types of AI developed to those that suit 
the interests of large technology companies, instead of the greater good—or 
at least other types of AI suited to smaller, more entrepreneurial ventures.
Second, the enhanced risk may discourage investment in AI ventures or 
require a higher return. This will deter entrepreneurship and limit the spec-
trum of AI investment to financiers capable of withstanding greater losses. 
It also may impact the valuation of existing AI companies and the market 
for buying and selling them. Again, larger incumbent players will likely 
have a considerable advantage.
In the business-to-business context, where consumer protection con-
cerns do not limit liability disclaimers,
126
it is likely that companies facing 
uncertain sources and degrees of liability will seek to protect themselves by 
allocating liability elsewhere in the value chain through the contracting pro-
cess. The parties may say, in effect, “I don’t think this will happen, as I have 
a good product, but I don’t know for sure, so if something unexpected does 
happen, I want you to pay for it.” For example, a provider may seek in its 
125. See Parker O’very, 3 Ways Self-Driving Cars Will Affect the Insurance Industry,
VENTURE BEAT (Jan. 26, 2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/01/26/3-ways-self-driving-
cars-will-affect-the-insurance-industry (noting that “Google, Volvo, and Mercedes-Benz al-
ready accept liability in cases where a vehicle’s self-driving system is at fault for a crash” and 
that “Tesla is taking things a step further by extending an insurance program to purchasers of 
Tesla vehicles.”). The larger market impacts on the insurance industry itself are likely to be 
significant. See, e.g., Paul Tullis, Self-Driving Cars Might Kill Auto Insurance as We Know It,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-19
/autonomous-vehicles-may-one-day-kill-car-insurance-as-we-know-it.
126. See, e.g., Sarah Denis, Using the Class Action Fairness Act as a Loophole Around 
the Magnuson Moss’s Jurisdictional Requirements, 19 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 124, 125 
(2016) (noting that “Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 
et seq. (2015), with the purpose of protecting consumers from deceptive warranty practices, 
specifically, narrow consumer product warranties that were often too convoluted for a layper-
son to understand.”).
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purchase of an AI algorithm (perhaps structured as an IP license) to allocate 
all risks of harm caused by products containing that algorithm to the innova-
tor who created it.
127
The innovator likely would prefer things the other way. 
In automation and augmentation settings, the issue can be resolved with in-
surance because a carrier can predict and model potential losses. The inabil-
ity to do so in autonomy seems to suggest that the risk itself will be unin-
surable, or perhaps only insurable at an unaffordable rate. Contracting will 
be further complicated by the inherent difficulty in valuing these defense 
and indemnity allocations, in that calculating the risk premium for these 
contract terms presents the same problems faced by insurers noted above.
This process will tend to favor players with market dominance, alt-
hough unlike situations involving third-party liability, this does not auto-
matically mean the largest and most financially powerful companies. A 
small innovator holding patents and other exclusive rights to a badly-needed 
technology can extract considerable monopoly-like concessions from pro-
viders seeking to create new products for fickle customers. The weakest 
party in the chain—in relative terms—could end up being stuck with one 
hundred percent of the liability if things go wrong. Again, this could impact 
entrepreneurship and the types of players willing to participate in the AI 
market.
The situation may also transform the very nature of the relationship be-
tween value chain participants. With autonomous AI, it may be impossible 
for parties to conclude bargained-for one-off transactions (or a series of 
them) for AI technology for at least two reasons. First, an algorithm never 
wears out or expires in the way that a mechanical device does. Errant AI in-
corporated into products may be blamed for unpredicted injuries many years 
or even decades later, particularly as other innovators and providers in the 
AI artifact’s distribution chain exhaust any available insurance or go out of 
127. An important part of software contracting involves controlling costs by limiting the 
liability of software developers for consequential damages arising from software errors. See, 
e.g., David R. Collins, Shrinkwrap, Clickwrap, and Other Software License Agreements: Liti-
gating a Digital Pig in a Poke in West Virginia, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 531, 539 (2009) (“Be-
cause an entire company may rely on only one software program to conduct business, permit-
ting recovery for products liability without limitation can potentially hold a developer liable 
for consequential damages amounting to millions or even billions of dollars for a single copy 
of a software product.”). Subsequent users of algorithms or software (e.g., those incorporating 
AI artifacts into their products and services) become bound by any liability provisions in the 
original distribution end-user license because any other use exceeds the license itself. See also 
Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software “Licenses” Really 
Sales, and How Will the Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 555, 588 (2004) (noting 
that “[i]f the distributor does pass on the end user license, the end user becomes bound by the 
liability limiting contract terms in the end user license. In this way, liability-limiting contract 
terms—even though not themselves license limitations—can pass down the distribution chan-
nel with the software copy.”).
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business.
128
This may transform the nature of the dealings between the vari-
ous parties in the chain into much more of an ongoing relationship with a 
longer-term perspective.
Second, the specter of indivisible liability will encourage innovators, 
providers, and users to work collaboratively on an ongoing basis to prevent 
harm in the first place. The roles create a feedback loop from innovation 
down to end-user and back again as the AI-enabled product learns with ex-
perience. Even where defense and indemnity are shiftable by contract, it of-
ten will prove far less expensive for the players to collaboratively repair 
problems discovered in AI artifacts than to incur the litigation costs of de-
fending cases brought by injured third parties. Bad press has its own costs, 
and as a practical matter an indemnity clause in an IP licensing agreement 
may do little to restore a company’s damaged reputation.
The need to cooperate also may force the parties to engage in different 
types of future transactions aimed at minimizing third-party liability. These 
could include duties to gather and retain information that will enable the 
parties to sort out responsibility amongst themselves if an unexpected event 
does occur. This may be harder than it sounds in practice, potentially creat-
ing additional challenges in complying with consumer privacy laws, gov-
ernment reporting obligations, maintaining trade secrets, and the like, not to 
mention adherence to contractual provisions that require it.
Cooperation also may require companies to make different design 
choices in the first place—for example, building reversibility into their AI 
that will allow them to undo undesirable learning by their algorithms or oth-
erwise accounts for unexpected events,
129
or designing processes that enable 
querying the AI system and increase accountability without revealing the 
inner workings of the system itself.
130
This might increase costs, slow down 
the development pipeline, and make complex systems even more cumber-
some. Again, the transformation of the dealings between the various parties 
128. The nature and magnitude of liability certainly may be impacted by statutes of limi-
tation (generally premised on the date that an injury occurs or upon which it is discovered). 
See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Replacing Strict Liability with a Contract-Based Products Lia-
bility Regime, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 171, 173 (1998) (noting that statutes of limitation in tort cas-
es “begin to run when the plaintiff’s injury occurs, or in some cases, when the injury is dis-
covered”). Certain industries also may lobby for special statutes of repose for their products, 
which time-limit claims to a period that begins to run on the date of first sale or transfer. See, 
e.g., Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 467 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that claims were 
barred under statute of repose that required claims against pharmaceutical companies to be 
brought within the shorter of ten years from the date of first sale or within one year after the 
drug’s expiration date).
129. See Lucas D. Introna, Maintaining the Reversibility of Foldings: Making the Ethics 
(Politics) of Information Technology Visible, 9 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 11, 21 (2007).
130. See Finale Doshi-Velez et al., Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role of Ex-
planation (Dec. 20, 2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.01134.
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into an ongoing relationship has implications for the AI value chain as a 
whole.
In the absence of an option to spread risk to others, who “wins” in a 
contract negotiation depends on a lot of factors—including relative bargain-
ing power, tolerance for risk, the depth of negotiators’ pockets, and ability 
to satisfy a judgment if one is assessed. Still, the negotiation process itself 
also has its own intrinsic value. It forces the parties to think long and hard 
about what might go wrong. Most contracts amount to bargained-for ex-
change, at least in theory, so the conversation will help to clarify at least 
some of the liability risks in a way that regulatory choices categorically al-
locating liability to one party versus another would not.
A more nuanced understanding of the nature of AI technology allows 
managers and executives to identify their organizations’ interests and objec-
tives working with AI solutions as well as their legal liability exposure. This 
is particularly important if they are considering transitioning from automa-
tion and augmentation AI to autonomous AI. By studying their role(s) in the 
AI value chain, organizations can anticipate the nature of their legal expo-
sure. Reframing their risk calculus away from a sole focus on contractual or 
tort liability in favor of promoting comprehensive responsibility in organi-
zational behavior may be the most effective approach to mitigate future le-
gal risks in the face of unknowns. Various factors support this argument, 
including the evolving nature of AI towards autonomy, the long shelf-life of 
digital inventions such as AI artifacts, and the modular nature of digital sys-
tems, with AI components that may find their way into a large number of AI 
solutions.
To limit their legal liability, organizations should actively foster the re-
sponsible development and use of AI innovation. This tenet, while applica-
ble to any technology, is particularly important for AI for several reasons. 
First, as noted above, an AI artifact’s lifespan is potentially indefinite. The 
digital aspects of AI artifacts do not have the limited shelf-lives associated 
with physical decay, and an AI algorithm can be reused and fully or partial-
ly incorporated into novel AI systems. Second, AI is not subject to the rep-
licability constraints of physical products; AI code can be replicated a large 
number of times at limited marginal cost and find its way into a great many 
types of AI systems.
131
This greatly magnifies the consequences of error. 
Third, the impending evolution of AI systems towards autonomy presents 
unforeseeable outcomes. This increases the imperatives on designers, pro-
viders, and users to identify and control as much of the downside as possi-
ble in the AI context.
131. As noted above, modification of the AI artifact before incorporation into another 
product or process may break the liability chain, provided that the modification itself was not 
foreseeable.
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All of this would suggest that companies are incentivized to take great 
care in minimizing all possible risks in the development and deployment of 
AI artifacts, controlling as much as possible on their own in order to mini-
mize liability. But despite the importance of risk management in AI innova-
tion, a new study of the actual behavior of AI professionals counterintuitive-
ly identifies considerable gaps in responsible behavior around AI systems, 
which companies should immediately begin to take steps to address.
B. Responsibility Implications—Studying the Ethical Perceptions of 
AI Professionals
Individuals with managerial responsibilities for the implementation, de-
sign, development, and distribution of AI systems within their organiza-
tions, or who are involved in offering such products and services to other 
organizations, also fall into the categories of AI innovators, distributors, and 
users. Given their understanding of AI technologies, as well as system ca-
pabilities and the risks associated with their use, AI professionals serve as 
critical participants in the value chain of AI development.
In order to preliminarily explore ethical perceptions of those making 
decisions about AI and the level of responsibility in the development of AI 
innovations,
132
we conducted a brief survey of technology managers and ex-
ecutives who play some role in AI development and who have expertise in 
the field of artificial intelligence (designated herein as “AI profession-
als”).
133
The respondent AI professionals answered ten questions about per-
sonal and corporate responsibility and ethical behavior within their organi-
zations in the development and deployment of AI technologies.
Eight questions that dealt with the importance of ethical principles and 
organizational practices in the ethical development or implementation of 
technologies are presented in Table 4, along with the percentages of positive 
responses. Overall, we found strong agreement among AI professionals on 
these questions. The respondents support the importance of ethical behavior 
in the development and implementation of new technologies, contemplate 
the potential social harm of their work, and follow ethical principles in their 
own development and implementation efforts.
With respect to ethical behavior at the enterprise level, the AI profes-
sionals surveyed also consistently report that their organization has written 
policies for the socially responsible development and implementation of 
new technologies, that these policies are followed, and that the declared 
values of their organization agrees with their own. Most also agree that 
132. There is some dispute whether such questions even are possible to answer. See, 
e.g., Cade Metz, Is Ethical A.I. Even Possible?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/business/ethics-artificial-intelligence.html.
133. See infra Technical Appendix for details about sample collection, preparation, and 
other descriptive statistics, including demographic variables.
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company leadership follows the organization’s stated ethics and values. Fi-
nally, a large number of these AI professionals disclose that their organiza-
tion offers mechanisms to report improper behavior in the development and 
implementation of new technologies.
Table 4. Responses to Questions About Ethical Principles and 
the Responsible Development of Technologies.
Question Agree
Q1. Being ethical is highly important in the development 
and/or implementation of new technologies.
98.8%
Q2. My organization ensures that its development and/or 
implementation of new technologies is done in a socially 
responsible manner.
97.56%
Q3. I agree with the declared values of my organization in 
relation to the socially responsible development and/or 
implementation of new technologies.
95.12%
Q4. I feel a personal obligation to ensure the socially 
responsible development and/or implementation of new 
technologies.
95.12%
Q5. My organization has written policies relating to the 
socially responsible development and/or implementation of 
new technologies.
93.90%
Q6. The behavior of my organization’s leaders in relation to 
the socially responsible development and/or implementation 
of new technologies is consistent with the stated ethics and 
values of my organization.
93.90%
Q7. I have the opportunity in my work to consider the wider 
social implications of what I am working on and the potential 
social harm(s) it could create.
93.90%
Q8. My organization has procedures for reporting improper 
behavior in relation to the socially responsible development 
and/or implementation of new technologies.
87.80%
Two other questions for AI professionals focused on the scope of their 
personal responsibility and their actions to date in terms of reporting any 
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concerns relating to the socially responsible use of technologies. These find-
ings are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5. Responses to Questions About Their Ethical 
Responsibility and Personal Concerns About the Responsible 
Use of Technologies.
Question Agree
Q9. I see my role as creating, implementing, and/or using the 
best technology possible; it is the responsibility of others to 
determine how such technology should be used and what 
limits should be imposed on it.
90.24%
Q10. Report having personal concerns relating to the socially 





The survey results reveal a significant responsibility gap between the 
beliefs and the actions of the AI professionals. A large majority of respond-
ents expressed great awareness and concern about the responsible develop-
ment and use of technology. They also agreed solidly with the values of 
their companies in this regard and reaffirmed the importance of ethical be-
havior, including their own actions, in the development and implementation 
of new technologies. Yet less than ten percent of them felt that it was their 
personal responsibility to determine the scope of responsible use for the 
technologies they build or deploy. Ninety percent of them thought that was 
someone else’s job. And it’s clear that these are not theoretical issues; near-
ly three quarters of the respondents confirmed not reporting to supervisors 
actual concerns relating to the socially responsible use of technology in 
their organizations. The most frequent justifications for not reporting are 
captured in Table 6.
134. Percentage reflects survey respondents who identified at least one reason for not 
communicating ethical concerns to their supervisors. On average, those responding positively 
identified 2.32 reasons for not doing so.
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Table 6. Top Reasons for Not Reporting to a Supervisor 
Concerns About the Socially Responsible Use of Technology
Reason Percent (count)135
The belief that reporting would not be anonymous 39.34% (24)
The fear of retaliation 36.07% (22)
The belief that someone else would do it 31.15% (19)
The belief that corrective action would not be taken 31.15% (19)
To avoid getting colleague(s) into trouble 26.23% (16)
Out of loyalty to the department or business unit 18.03% (11)
The belief that the issue was not important to 
immediate supervisors
16.39% (10)
The belief that it was not part of their job 13.11% (8)
As discussed above, in order to minimize legal liability for AI innova-
tions, it would seem that decision-makers leading the innovation and pro-
duction of AI solutions in modern enterprises have many increased incen-
tives to act responsibly. At a minimum, this means operating under a set of 
known organizational values and using clearly defined procedures to identi-
fy and address ethical violations. Yet based on these findings, this does not 
appear to be happening—at least amongst the AI professionals who partici-
pated in the survey.
This study of AI professionals reveals an apparent gap between stated 
responsibilities and values and behaviors when managing technology. They 
report clear personal and organizational values to minimize negative social 
impacts and act ethically in AI development. Yet they do not feel directly 
responsible for the actual execution of such responsible behaviors and con-
sistently fail to report ethical concerns. This AI responsibility gap is of great 
135. See infra Technical Appendix for details on the collection and recoding of survey 
responses.
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consequence to organizations working or relying on AI innovations, as it 
could greatly increase future legal exposure in automation and augmenta-
tion as well as autonomy. Given the liability risks inherent in the creation, 
deployment, and utilization of AI systems, it is important for organizations 
developing and using AI to address this gap—and quickly.
A few clear recommendations and challenges emerge from this study. 
First, companies must not only identify clear values and hire individuals 
who share those principles, but also reframe responsibility in the use and 
development of AI innovations to favor a deeper understanding of the social 
and legal consequences and a willingness to act based on that understand-
ing.
Second, companies should look beyond short-term economic considera-
tions and immediate outcomes when acting on their AI responsibilities, and 
they should train their employees to do so as well. In other words, compa-
nies should avoid short-term thinking when evaluating AI systems’ impact 
and revenue-oriented metrics of performance that discourage employees 
from taking responsible action. Many challenges will arise from short-term 
organizational perspectives, particularly in digital companies seeking to 
market innovations and generate revenue quickly, especially given the un-
foreseeable legal liabilities that their AI innovations may create in the long 
term. While this change in perspective may be difficult to achieve and re-
quires further research, it is one that companies should seek to encode in 
their organizations’ actions as well as their vision statements and operation-
al guidelines. This is especially important because algorithms do not “wear 
out” like tangible objects do, such that the applicable time horizon in which 
harm can arise is far longer. AI managers and executives thus should adopt 
a long-term approach in evaluating the consequences of their AI innovations 
and products.
Finally, it is important to create an opportunity to fix problems when 
they become apparent, especially those problems that could not have been 
anticipated beforehand (the “unknown unknowns”). As a matter of company 
policy, AI innovators and providers should aim to build reversibility
136
and 
visibility into AI artifacts so that actions can be undone and to ensure that 
the unexpected behavior of the AI system can be explored and better under-
stood. As noted above, all innovators and providers in the AI artifact supply 
chain have significant incentives to collaborate with one another in the long 
term to investigate and repair “defective” AI artifacts.
V. Concluding Thoughts
The goal of this article was to begin a conversation about legal, ethical, 
and managerial responsibility in creating and using AI technologies. Many 
136. See Introna, supra note 129, at 15–23.
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more questions require careful consideration. One of these is how to balance 
the various stakeholder interests identified herein from a policy perspective. 
Liability for AI participants can inhibit innovation and product develop-
ment, reduce investment, limit the willingness of owner/operators to pur-
chase AI artifacts in the first place, and tie up resources in legal defense and 
cross-claims for indemnity that could be used for other things.
Too much liability will create a drag on the entire AI value chain, 
which is the lifeblood of AI advancement. This suggests that some limita-
tions on liability may be appropriate in some circumstances.
137
Yet innova-
tors and producers also clearly need incentives to be as careful as possible in 
their design, manufacture, and operational choices, and imposing liability 
on them clearly advances this goal.
138
The right balance between these com-
peting interests to some extent involves larger questions of social welfare 
maximization. Although the degree to which tort law promotes efficient re-
source allocation is an open question,
139
some suggest that the future bene-
fits of AI will far outweigh its costs, even when human life is concerned.
Take the case of autonomous vehicles. How the legal system should at-
tribute responsibility for the crashes that autonomous vehicles cause is an 
open and hotly debated question.
140
Yet given the prediction that automated 
vehicles will save thousands of lives per year by eliminating human error,
141
one author hypothesized “[w]ho cares if Tesla’s Autopilot could have been 
improved in some incremental way that would have prevented three fatali-
ties if it can save tens of thousands every year? To the welfare economist, 
the appropriate question is not whether Autopilot was “defective,” but ra-
ther whether imposing liability will help encourage an efficient allocation of 
resources.”
142
These kinds of considerations ultimately may determine the extent to 
which individuals will be permitted to recover at all, as well as the measure 
of damages that will be available.
143
No-fault regimes, such as those pro-
137. See, e.g., Calo, supra note 119, 601–12 (discussing selective immunity for robots).
138. See, e.g., Weston Kowert, Note, The Foreseeability of Human-Artificial Intelli-
gence Interactions, 96 TEX. L. REV. 181, 199 (2017) (noting that if vaccine and automobile 
“manufacturers aren’t going to be held liable, then they lose much of their incentive to im-
prove their product.”).
139. See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 
544–60 (2003) (discussing various facets of the interpretive and prescriptive economic deter-
rence theories and critiques of the doctrines).
140. See Alexander B. Lemann, Autonomous Vehicles, Technological Progress, and the 
Scope Problem in Products Liability, 12 J. TORT L. 157, 175–76 (2019).
141. Id. at 157 (“Autonomous vehicles are widely expected to save tens of thousands of 
lives each year by making car crashes attributable to human error – currently the overwhelm-
ing majority of fatal crashes – a thing of the past.”).
142. Id. at 192–93.
143. It is not uncommon to impose damage limiting schemes in circumstances where the 
public interest outweighs that of individual claimants—as in the case of medical malpractice. 
See Michael J. Cetra, Damage Control: Statutory Caps on Medical Malpractice Claims, State 
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posed in Europe for certain AI products,
144
may prove useful, though their 
application to various players within the AI value chain has yet to be con-
sidered. Insurance pools funded by manufacturing groups also may be worth 
exploring.
145
Another option is to consider the pros and cons of leaving the legal gray 
area untouched and simply letting courts innovate through the common 
law.
146
While this would make the AI development landscape harder for 
companies to navigate, it has some appeal. This is particularly true because 
it can be extraordinarily difficult to achieve correct regulatory solutions ex 
ante, especially for rapidly-developing technologies. As Judge Easterbrook 
noted in connection with emerging issues of cyberspace in the mid-1990s, a 
market-based solution might be best:
“Error in legislation is common, and never more so than when the 
technology is galloping forward. Let us not struggle to match an 
imperfect legal system to an evolving world that we understand 
poorly. Let us instead do what is essential to permit the participants 
in this evolving world to make their own decisions.”
147
Much useful dialogue will come simply from helping to ask the right 
questions, particularly because autonomous AI will undoubtedly raise 
unique issues that the law has not yet encountered.
148
Constitutional Challenges, and Texas’ Proposition 12, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 537, 542–43 (2004) 
(discussing state constitutional amendments authorizing state legislatures to cap damages in 
medical malpractice cases).
144. E.g., Roeland de Bruin, Autonomous Intelligent Cars on the European Intersection 
of Liability and Privacy – Regulatory Challenges and the Road Ahead, 7 EUR. J. RISK REG.
485, 490 (2016).
145. Insurance pools may be especially useful in the face of potentially unlimited liabil-
ity that could leave a company bankrupt. See, e.g., Leonard J. Long, Bankruptcy Lesson of 
Future Mass Tort Claims: Potential Mass Tort Victims Should Have Catastrophic Injury In-
surance, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 357, 367 (1997) (“[I]f the remedy (principally compensatory 
damages for injuries suffered), available to tort victims who suffer catastrophic injury or sub-
stantial loss of income is a separately funded insurance pool, then such tort victims are not 
dependent on the continued solvency of their tortfeasor and the precarious fortunes of the 
bankruptcy process.”).
146. See, e.g., Marta Katarzyna Kołacz et al., Who Should Regulate Disruptive Technol-
ogy?, 10 EUR. J. RISK REGUL. 4, 4 (2019) (arguing that the judiciary is best suited to handling 
cases presenting risky new technologies whereas regulation was required for technologies 
whose risks are not foreseeable at the time of the technological innovation); Brandon W. 
Jackson, Artificial Intelligence and the Fog of Innovation: A Deep-Dive on Governance and 
the Liability of Autonomous Systems, 35 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 35 (2019) (dis-
cussing a significant role for the judiciary in shaping legal regulation of AI).
147. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEG. F.
207, 215–16 (1996).
148. See Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 45, 49–51
(2015).
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Technical Appendix
The data (n=82) obtained in this study
149
through an online Qualtrics 
panel focused exclusively on managers and executive-level employees who 
supervised other employees and for whom artificial intelligence technolo-
gies were a significant part of their role, educational background, or work 
experience. All participants answered all questions in the survey, including 
for all of the responses discussed above,
150
and the demographic questions 
summarized below.
Participants answered survey questions 1–9 as seven-point Likert scale 
items, ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. The positive 
responses reported in Table 4 and Table 5
151
correspond to the sum of re-
spondents who selected “strongly agree,” “agree,” or “somewhat agree,” out 
of the total number of participants. Survey question 10 (Table 4) allowed 
respondents to select multiple items from a list of nine reasons (including 
“not applicable,” with a narrative option to provide a reason) for not com-
municating their ethical concerns. Table 5
152
reflects the number of times 
each reason was reported by one of the survey participants, out of the total 
number of participants who reported concerns.
The authors calculated descriptive statistics for demographic variables 
collected from the sample. Participants average 3.68 years of professional 
experience (standard deviation of 1.02 years), and 45.12% of them were 
female. All respondents supervised other employees, as summarized in Ta-
ble 7.
Table 7. Number of Employees Supervised by Participants




149. Original data from the study remains on file with the authors.
150. See discussion supra Part IV.
151. See supra Tables 4–5.
152. See supra Table 5.
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Industry sectors included leisure and hospitality, professional and busi-
ness services, and health services (see Table 8 for details).




Leisure and Hospitality 29
Professional and Business Services 14
Health Services 10
Trade, Transportation, and Utilities 9
Natural Resources and Mining 7





The most common company size among those surveyed was 100 to 499
employees, as set forth in Table 9.
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Table 9. Sizes of the Companies of the Technology Managers 
and Executives Surveyed
Percentage Company Size
1 to 9 2.44%
10 to 99 20.73%
100 to 499 32.93%
500 to 999 20.73%
1000+ 23.17%
